





The discipline of law, as it is 
institutionalized in the Anglo-
American tradition, and more 
generally in the West, is responding 
in a variety of ways to the challenges 
of globalization. These responses 
are dynamic, fragmented, exciting, 
and threatening. One task for 
legal theory is to make sense of 
and evaluate such developments. 
Individual scholars need to ask: 
What are the implications of 
globalization for my specialism or 
this research topic or my course? 
The purpose of this lecture is to 
suggest an approach to this question 
through self-critical examination 
of one’s working assumptions 
from a global perspective, using 
illustrative “ideal types” of general 
assumptions and tendencies 
underpinning (a) Western traditions 
of academic law; (b) the “Country 
and Western Tradition” of classical 
micro-comparative law and (c) a 
naïve model of legal writings about 
transplants/reception/diffusion. 
These constructions suggest that 
our academic culture has tended to 
be state-oriented, secular, positivist, 
“top-down”, Northo-centric, ignorant 
of other traditions, unempirical, and 
universalist in respect of morals. 
These ideal types highlight some 
crucial points at which they are 
challenged by adopting a global 
perspective. The lecture draws 
attention to the paucity of our stock 
of analytic concepts that transcend 
legal traditions and cultures.
At the Montesquieu Seminars, new developments in legal 
theory are explored and discussed. Fundamental problems 
experienced in the (practices of) law are reﬂ ected critically. 
A broad range of disciplines contribute at these attempts 
of sustained critical reﬂ ection. No particular school of legal 
theory is preferred over another. 
Tilburg Law School has an open mind for new approaches 
to law and does not want to limit the debate to the agenda 
set by some school, movement or discipline. As a result, 
while the seminars are conceived around urgent actual 
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PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS FOR THE  
GLOBAL LAW SCHOOL  
 
Introducing the fifth Montesquieu Seminar 
 
Willem J. Witteveen 
 
In 2009 the School of Law of Tilburg University celebrated its 9th 
lustrum. During a special edition of the Montesquieu Seminars 
professor William Twining delivered a lecture on Globalisation and 
legal scholarship. At that time the yearly Montesquieu lectures were 
already becoming a Tilburg tradition. The general idea of the 
lectures was and still is to invite outstanding scholars who have 
done interdisciplinary work with the kind of broad-minded 
intellectual attitude that Montesquieu fostered. In earlier editions 
socio-legal scholar Brian Tamanaha talked about the perils of legal 
instrumentalism, James Boyd White addressed the ethical 
problems of law through a reading of literature, Tom Tyler gave a 
psychologist’s view of the reasons people have to obey the law, and 
Michael Ignatieff spoke on some of the larger issues of peace and 
human rights at an event co-hosted with the Nexus Institute. 
When global law is the issue, Professor Twining combines theory 
and practice, as he is both an eminent scholar and a true world 
citizen. He is of course known as the Quain Professor of 
Jurisprudence Emeritus of University College London, but he is 
also a world traveller who has worked extensively in Eastern Africa, 
the Commonwealth, the United States and also in the Netherlands. 
William Twining has been in Tilburg before. In the nineties, he 
gave a wonderful class on narrative and advocacy, related to his 
work on evidence. Also, he visited Tilburg to discuss the future of 
legal education, in respect of his investigation of the state of legal 
education in the Anglo-American world (Blackstone’s Tower). And 
there was also a series of lectures on the challenges that increasing 
globalisation bring to the study and practice of law as part of a 
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lecture tour that was instrumental to his writing of a book on 
General Jurisprudence.  
 
Globalisation and legal scholarship is an outgrowth of this latter 
undertaking. The topic is of great interest to people working in the 
Tilburg School of Law. The most remarkable aspect of the 
development of the School of Law over the last five years has been 
that the work done in research but also in teaching has become 
more transnational and international. The facts speak for 
themselves: publications increasingly in English, more people 
participating in international research networks, larger numbers of 
students from abroad. The School of Law is contemplating a new 
educational strategy envisioning students who on graduation are 
able to take part in legal work in various parts of the world. The 
ambition is to create a global law school. 
These changes reflect a changing perception – not only in 
Tilburg by all means - of law and legal phenomena being studied. 
The idea that law is mainly national law, organized within the 
boundaries of sovereign states, is eroding. Scholars tend to think of 
law now as crossing borders. The European dimension is 
permeating all of national law. But local developments may also 
have significance in different parts of the world. As boundaries 
have blurred and comparative and transnational research has 
become imperative, Tilburg scholars join larger communities of 
scholars doing the same kind of work in other universities in 
foreign places. And the intellectual challenges are presented by 
problems and developments which similarly are not contained 
within the borders of national legal systems. Interestingly, this 
globalization of the world of law has not diminished in any way the 
importance of the national level, as the state is still the most 
powerful locus of decision-making, law-making and conflict 
resolution. But the old hierarchical picture has changed drastically. 
The relevance of national law is compatible with the relevance of 
local law. Indeed, some of the most important factors affecting 
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global developments occur below the national level. The central 
thesis of professor Twining’s work on General Jurisprudence is 
precisely that most processes of so-called ‘globalisation’ take place 
at sub-global levels and that a healthy cosmopolitan discipline of 
law should encompass all levels of social relations and legal 
orderings. What is called for is an adaptation of the intellectual 
heritage of Western jurisprudence to the new predicament of 
global law. This requires a paradigm shift. If there is to be a global 
law school, it is necessary to investigate a large range of issues, in 
order to be able to develop a curriculum that is free from the 
assumptions of legal education that are still mostly inherited from 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
 
Marco Polo’s cosmopolitanism 
 
So how does globalization affect the work we do as legal scholars 
and teachers? Before turning to professor Twining’s contribution 
to these issues, let us think back in time to two remarkable men 
who affected profound changes in the reigning perspective on legal 
phenomena and the world: Marco Polo and Montesquieu. 
 Long before the era of the nation-state a Venetian trader and 
adventurer set sail towards the East. Marco Polo accompanied his 
father and uncle between 1271 and 1275 on a journey along the 
fabled Silk Route to Central Asia, where they reached China and 
the court of the Mongolian emperor Kublai Khan. Kublai Khan 
was very interested in his Western visitors, entrusting Marco Polo 
with many diplomatic missions that brought him on extensive 
travels through the land of the Mongols for the next 17 years. In 
1295 the party sailed home, calling at Sumatra, southern India and 
Persia along the way, before finally reaching Venice. The story of 
the travels of Marco Polo would become world famous, but the 
story of how this story was assembled is more important for us. In 
1298 the navy of Genoa, Venice’s powerful rival for commercial 
dominance on the seas, gathered forces for an assault on the fleet 
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of the Serenissima Republica of Venice. In the Venetian defence 
fleet there was a ship bought and fitted for war by Marco Polo who 
himself sailed on it to lead the fight. Alas, in the battle his ship ran 
aground in the lagoon. The Genoese forces won the battle, taking 
some 8000 prisoners (which is a lot when we remember that the 
total population of Venice in those days numbered 100,000.) 
Marco Polo was among those captured. He was held in the 
Genoese state prison, the Palazzo di San Giorgio, for a number of 
years. There, as a Venetian commander, he was treated with 
deference. Marco Polo started telling his exotic stories of his 
adventures in the East. ‘The whole city gathered to see him and to 
talk to him, not treating him as a prisoner, but as a very dear friend 
and greatly honoured gentleman, and showed him so much 
honour and affection that there was never an hour of the day that 
he was not visited by the most noble gentlemen of that city, and 
presented with everything necessary for his daily living.’ This was a 
statement by Giambattista Ramusio, a Renaissance scholar who 
compiled one of the earliest accounts of Marco Polo’s career. These 
were stories intended to amuse. This became even more marked 
by his unique collaboration with another prisoner, Rustichello of 
Pisa, a writer of Arthurian romances who had once been a 
favourite of King Edward I of England. Marco Polo told the tales, 
Rustichello wrote them down and embellished them, making 
them conform to the literary conventions of that time. 
It was later thought that all of these travel stories were 
fantastical inventions. It was even doubted whether Marco Polo 
had really visited the court of the Mongol emperor. Only in the 19th 
century fresh research was done into the tales. It was discovered 
that while at the surface there were many literary tales, the facts 
referred to almost always fitted the evidence. Marco Polo had 
indeed been to the places he described. His information about the 
religion, the customs, the legal arrangements, the monetary 
economy, the advanced technology of the Chinese were all 
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remarkably accurate. Through an act of reconstruction many 
aspects of the Mongol empire could be found.1 
So what we have here is an opening up of the world for the 
closed Western mind, showing it there was a vastly more advanced 
civilisation in the East, told through the fantastical tales of a 
traveller (not a scholar) who really knew what he was talking about, 
but could only tell his story according to literary conventions that 
obscure its factual value. As sophisticated modern researchers of 
processes of globalisation, we have progressed but only slightly, 
since nobody can visit all the places that are relevant and do in-
depth research into the legal culture there. Researchers still 
unavoidably take a lot on hear-say and on the authority of others, 
though of course fantastic stories have been disparaged as a 




With the emergence of the scientific attitude and methods in the 
Enlightenment, the desire to really know became stronger. When 
Montesquieu, the intellectual hero of these lectures, published his 
Spirit of the Laws in 1748, he was eschewing fantasy. But he was no 
less dependent on uncontrollable sources. He had travelled, but 
never been to the land of the Turks (which for him became the 
home of despotic regimes) and certainly not to China, a land that 
he knew through the eyewitness reports of Jesuit travellers mostly. 
Using a fascinating ensemble of research materials, some of it as 
fantastic as the tales of Marco Polo, Montesquieu showed himself 
an adventurer of the mind, someone who uses the stimulus of 
information about the world in order to create a conceptual 
framework that must make it possible to understand its social laws 
better. He distinguished four regimes: monarchical, aristocratic, 
democratic, despotic and held that there was an ideal shape for 
                                                 




each regime that all governing activities there had to fit. This 
fourfold scheme of regimes was then used to tell us stories about 
how law works in many different situations and cultures. 
Montesquieu is a comparative scholar who connects insights about 
various places of the world.  
An instructive example is his analysis of how China and ancient 
Sparta deal with morality laws, coming from Book 19, chapter 16. 
He begins with a piece of conceptual analysis in the style of general 
jurisprudence.  
 
‘Mores and manners are usages that laws have not established, or 
that they have not been able, or have not wanted, to establish. The 
difference between laws and mores is that, while laws regulate the 
actions of the citizen, mores regulate the actions of the man. The 
difference between mores and manners is that the first are more 
concerned with internal and the latter external, conduct.’2 
 
Then there follows an argumentation in the style of comparative 
law. 
 
‘Sometimes in a state these things are confused with one 
another. Lycurgus (ruler and legislator of Sparta) made a 
single code, for the laws, the mores, and the manners, and 
the legislators of China did the same. (...) The principal 
object of the Chinese legislators was to have their people live 
in tranquillity. They wanted men to have much respect for 
each other; they wanted each one to feel at each instant that 
he owed much to the others; they wanted every citizen to 
depend, in some respect, on another citizen. Therefore, they 
extended the rules of civility to a great many people. (...)’ 
 
                                                 
2  Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, edited by Anne Cohler, Basia 
Miller and Harold Stone, Cambridge University Press 1989: Book 19, 
Chapter 16 at 317. 
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After these two steps, one theoretical and one comparative, 
Montesquieu then reflects back on his own society, where public 
behaviour is not contained in laws but in unwritten customs of 
polite behaviour between members of the same class. 
 
‘Civility is preferable, in this regard, to politeness. Politeness 
flatters the vices of others, and civility keeps us from 
displaying our own; it is a barrier that men put between 
themselves in order to keep from being corrupted.’ 
 
The reader who has followed Montesquieu’s reasoning up to this 
point, sees him now turning his and our attention back to Sparta. 
 
‘Lycurgus, whose institutions were harsh, did not have 
civility as an object when he formed manners; he had in 
view the bellicose spirit he wanted to give his people. Always 
correcting or being corrected, always instructing and being 
instructed, as simple as they were rigid, these people 
practiced virtues for each other, rather than showing them 
regard.’ 
 
Montesquieu has in this short piece of the book performed an 
interesting analysis that has taken various clearly marked stages 
(and this pattern can be found in many places in The Spirit of the 
Laws). On what evidence is it based? The text gives us one footnote, 
to a description of China by Farther Jean Baptiste du Halde, a 
Jesuit missionary. Montesquieu was perhaps less well informed 
than Marco Polo who does not give us his sources but had at least 
done some fieldwork. Scholars in comparative law would today not 
be able to proceed in this way, more sources would be required, 
especially from Chinese authors themselves, and more empirical 
data. We may indeed have progressed beyond the methodology of 
the 18th century. But note that Montesquieu is able to do two things 
simultaneously. He develops a jurisprudence of general concepts 
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that can be used in the analysis of how law works in different 
cultures. At the same time, he is being informed by facts coming 
from descriptions of these various legal cultures to develop and 
refine his concepts and categories. The jurisprudence of 
Montesquieu is balancing theory and empirical research, 
developed in a clear and witty style of writing. Perhaps this 
combination is the reason The Spirit of the Laws remains a source 
of insights even today.  
 
Beyond Marco Polo and Montesquieu? 
 
Can contemporary scholars of the legal world really go far beyond 
Marco Polo and Montesquieu? Do not answer this question in the 
affirmative too quickly! With the enormous increase of available 
information, open to us through electronic sources, the problem of 
accurate selection becomes even more urgent for us than it was for 
Montesquieu. We still have to decide what to believe, which 
sources to accept, which interpretations are trustworthy, we still 
usually do not know how a complex legal arrangement really 
works. We still do not speak enough languages, overlooking the 
errors of translation that must be reflected in the English articles 
that are now the mainstay of scientific communication, often 
carrying greater weight than reports in the local language. The 
Latin of Marco Polo’s days, Montesquieu’s French, our English: all 
these are failed attempts at the universal language.  
Where we have really progressed, and can make still further 
progress, is precisely in developing our conceptual schemes. The 
science of jurisprudence can be made to fit aspects of the world 
much better than it did in the past. It is one of William Twining’s 
contentions that we need a general jurisprudence that 
encompasses the legal aspects of the world, building upon but also 
improving upon the concepts developed in the tradition of Anglo-
American analytical jurisprudence and in the continental-
European traditions in legal theory. His book General Jurisprudence 
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is a bold attempt at systematization that respects difference and 
variation and in this methodological aspect it is reminiscent of the 






GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
 
William Twining 3 
 
It is an honour to be invited to deliver the Montesquieu Lecture. It 
is also a pleasure for two specific reasons. First, I consider myself 
to be a Montesquieuite in spirit, if not in detail. Montesquieu was 
very influential on two of my gurus, Jeremy Bentham and Karl 
Llewellyn, though for different reasons. For Llewellyn his 
emphasis on empirical perspectives and on the particularities of 
social and political context was an inspiration. For Bentham, 
Montesquieu was a pioneer of clear sighted Enlightenment 
rationalism, challenging tradition, full of scintillating insights; but 
his lack of system and his interpretation of the separation of 
powers were also something to react against.4 Montesquieu 
tempered Bentham’s enthusiasm for a universal science of 
legislation, but he did not dent Bentham’s ambition to be 
“legislator of the World”.5 I sometimes claim, semi-seriously, to 
                                                 
3  Quain Professor of Jurisprudence Emeritus, University College 
London and Visiting Professor, University of Miami School of Law. 
This is a revised and extended version of the Montesquieu Lecture 
delivered at the University of Tilburg in July 2009. An earlier version, 
entitled “Implications of ‘globalisation’ for law as a discipline”, was 
published in Andrew Halpin and Volker Roeben (eds.) Theorising the 
Global Legal Order Oxford: (2009); parts are reproduced here by kind 
permission of the copyright-holders. I am grateful to Terry Anderson, 
Andrew Halpin, Volker Roeben, Mark Taylor, and participants in 
seminars and other discussions in Aberdeen, Dublin, Georgetown (in 
London), Helsinki, Miami, Princeton, Sheffield, Southampton, 
Swansea, and University College London for many helpful comments 
and suggestions. 
4  Bentham’s general estimate of Montesquieu, is recorded in his 
commonplace book at 10 Works 143 (Bowring edition): “Locke - dry, 
cold, languid, wearisome, will live for ever. Montesquieu - rapid, 
brilliant, glorious, enchanting, will not outlive this century.” 
5  See Appendix on “Bentham and Montesquieu”. 
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organise my life on Montesquieuite principles: Every year I spend 
January through April in Florida as an academic snowbird. At that 
time the weather is gorgeous, there is little rain and the 
temperature is a moderate 12-27 degrees C. I migrate back to 
Oxford for Spring, Summer and Autumn, thereby fortifying my 
commitment to liberal democratic principles. Climate may not be 
all, but its importance in both law and life is widely 
underestimated. 
 
My second reason for being pleased to be here today is that nearly 
ten years ago I gave three lectures in Tilburg on “General 
Jurisprudence”. These were in effect a rather tentative prolego-
menon to my book of the same title that was published in 2009.6 
So this occasion provides me with an opportunity to report back on 
how my thinking has developed over the past decade.  
 
The central question of my Tilburg lectures and the book has 
remained constant: what are the implications of so-called 
“globalisation” for the discipline of law and for jurisprudence as its 
theoretical or more abstract part? At a general level, my answer has 
also remained constant: adopting a global perspective has 
important implications for our understanding of law, but at this 
stage in history we are not yet very well-equipped to provide an 
over-arching Grand Theory or even many reliable generalisations 
about the hugely complex phenomena of law in the world as a 
whole: as yet we lack concepts, data, hypotheses and models 
adequate for the task. Our Western academic heritage provides 
some promising starting-points on which to build, but the 
challenges are enormous. The message is anti-reductionist: it 
emphasises the complexity of legal phenomena and warns against 
                                                 
6  This lecture draws on three main works, Globalisation and Legal Theory 
(2000) (hereafter GLT), The Great Juristic Bazaar (2002) (hereafter 
GJB) and General Jurisprudence (2009) (hereafter GJP) in which nearly 
all of the main points in the text are explored at greater length. 
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simplistic, exaggerated, false, meaningless, superficial, and 
ethnocentric generalisations about law in the world as whole. Like 
Montesquieu, I have emphasised the variability of local conditions 
and the diversity of legal phenomena. 
 
The general message has not changed, but the basic approach and 
ideas have been refined and developed in a number of directions. 
In this lecture, rather than survey a wide range of issues, I shall 
suggest an approach to the specific question of the relevance and 
implications of globalisation for their work from the point of view 
of individual legal scholars and teachers. I shall start by briefly 
sketching the current context, then talk briefly about the term 
“globalisation”, before suggesting a way in which internal critique 
of one’s operating assumptions about one’s subject at different 
levels of generality can help an individual academic lawyer to 




For nearly thirty years we have been bombarded by talk of 
“globalisation”. Not surprisingly, such talk has involved a great deal 
of hyperbole, reflected in excited titles of apocalyptic books: The 
Borderless World, The End of History, Our Global Neighbourhood, 
Jihad vs. McWorld, The World IS Flat, Clash of Civilizations, The End 
of Sovereignty.7 After a reasonable intellectual lag, academic law has 
responded to these developments. This is illustrated by law 
                                                 
7  Ken’ichi Ohmae (1991) The Borderless World; Francis Fukuyama (1992) 
The End of History and the Last Man; The Report of the Commission on 
Global Governance (1995) Our Global Neighborhood (The Brandt 
Report); Benjamin R. Barber (1995) Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism 
and Tribalism are Reshaping the World; Samuel Huntington (1997) The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order; Thomas L. 
Friedman (2005) The World IS Flat: a brief history of the twenty-first 




publishers’ catalogues, the proliferation of journals with “global” or 
“international” in the title, and significant, sometimes quite 
radical, “rethinkings” of fields such as international law, 
comparative law, EU law, and human rights.8 However, this 
response has been uneven and fragmented. It has varied from 
country to country. For example, legal education in the United 
Kingdom and the United States has been slow to change, perhaps 
because most professional courses and examinations still focus 
almost entirely on domestic municipal law.9 But in the United 
Kingdom our legal culture has been more cosmopolitan than that 
of the United States, partly because of membership of the 
                                                 
8  E.g. for public international law Philip Allott, (1990) Eunomia: new 
order for the world. Thomas M. Franck (1995) Fairness in International 
Law and Institutions; Martti Koskenniemi (2005) From Apology to 
Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument; and Samantha 
Besson and John Tasioulas (eds.) (2008) Philosophy of International 
Law. For comparative law: Ian Edge (ed.) (2000) Comparative Law in 
Global Perspective; Annelise Riles (ed.) (2001) Rethinking the Masters of 
Comparative Law; Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday (eds.) (2003) 
Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions; Esin Őrűcű and 
David Nelken (eds) (2007) Comparative Law: A Handbook . For human 
rights: Upendra Baxi, (2002) The Future of Human Rights ( 2nd edn. 
2006) and (2007), Human Rights in a Posthuman World; Marie-
Bénédicte Dembour (2006) Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections 
on the European Convention; Conor Gearty (2006) Can Human Rights 
Survive? (Hamlyn Lectures); James Nickel, Making Sense of Human 
Rights (2007); James Griffin, (2008) On Human Rights . For EC law 
Neil Walker, (ed.) (2003) Sovereignty in Transition and Neil Walker 
(2005) “Legal Theory and the European Union : A 25th Anniversary 
Essay” 25 Oxford Jo. Legal Studies 581; Ian Ward (1996) A Critical 
Introduction to European Law (London: Butterworth. 3rd edn, 
forthcoming Cambridge). 
9  Courses with international, comparative, transnational and global in 
the title have proliferated, but the take-up seems to have been quite 
limited. Although Miami aspires to be a major centre for transnational 




European Union and the Council of Europe, partly because of 
some relics of the colonial era, and partly because our academic 
legal culture has been more detached from the particularities of 
legal practice than in America - see, for example, the strong 
emphasis on Roman law in the British tradition, at least until 
recently.  
 
Today, in your country and mine, nearly all academic lawyers are 
specialists. Most of the responses to globalisation have come from 
fields that traditionally have had a significant transnational focus. 
There has understandably been less pressure on specialists in 
areas normally considered to be domestic or local, such as land 
law, obligations, criminal law, civil procedure, constitutional law 
and local government law.10 Nevertheless there is a nagging 
question facing any legal scholar: What is the relevance of 
“globalisation” to my subject or this course or specific topic? The 




For present purposes it is not necessary to enter far into debates 
about the meaning and significance of “globalisation”.11 Here it 
                                                 
10  However, comparative law has extended to cover most of these fields 
and now provides a transnational perspective and materials for the 
specialist in domestic law.  
11  A quick guide for the unitiated. A good way in for lawyers is Singer 
(2002/2004). Basic introductions to the literature on globalisation 
include T. Friedman (2005), Giddens and Hutton (2000), Hebron and 
Stack (2009), Held and McGrew (2007) and Sassen (2007b); more 
sophisticated accounts relevant to law include Keohane and Nye 
(2003), Sassen (2007a), and Slaughter (2004); a useful counter-
balance to the enthusiastic globalisers is Hirst and Thompson (1999). 
There is a vast literature on the dangers (e.g. Gray (1999)) and benefits 
(e.g. Dunning (2003), Bhagwhati (2004)) of economic globalisation. 
Significant contributors to the discussion of the relevance of 
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will suffice to distinguish between two primary meanings of the 
term: a narrow one focused on economics; and a broad one that 
encompasses all modern tendencies to transnationalisation. In 
some contexts the term “globalisation” is used to refer to economic 
relations within a single putative “world economy”. This usage is 
illustrated by “the anti-globalisation” movement, which is directed 
mainly against the dominance of the world economy by capitalist 
ideology and practices associated with a few powerful countries 
and institutions. This is narrow in two ways: it refers to only one 
set of relations, and it is mainly confined to the world treated as a 
whole. In this lecture I shall use “globalisation” in a broad sense, 
following Anthony Giddens,12 to go beyond economics to include 
any processes that tend to make human relations - economic, 
political, cultural, communicative etc - more interdependent. 
Sometimes this refers to the world as a whole, i.e. those relations 
and issues that are genuinely worldwide; but sometimes it refers to 
sub-global relations that transcend national boundaries to a greater 
or lesser degree.  
 
This doubly broad use of “globalisation” to refer to any significant 
transnationalising processes is appropriate here, because this is 
relevant to our immediate concerns. However, one needs to cast a 
sceptical eye on loose talk about “global law”, “global lawyers”, 
“global law firms”, or “global legal culture”.13 This is not because 
                                                                                                
globalisation to legal theory include Arthurs, H. Berman, P. Berman, 
Glenn, Goldman, Pogge, Santos, Slaughter, Tamanaha, and Teubner 
(for references see bibliography); several of these are discussed in 
detail in GLT and GJP. 
12  Giddens (1990) at p.64. 
13  In law “global” is indiscriminately used to mean universal, worldwide, 
widespread, transcending two or more legal traditions, or just 
transnational. On “g-words” see GJP at pp. 14-15. “Global law” can 
mean law that claims to be, aspires to be, or in fact operates 
universally, very widely, or just transnationally. Usually this refers to a 
single order or system (e.g. a [new] “world legal order”) that operates or 
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such talk is always unjustified, but rather because so many 
generalisations about so-called “global” phenomena are either 
exaggerated (“global” means widespread)14 or conflate aspiration 
                                                                                                
aspires to operate uniformly, or a modern equivalent of ius gentium, 
but sometimes it refers to a picture of all law in the world, which is very 
varied. Sometimes “global law” is confusingly equated with public 
international law: but not all international law is truly global; on some 
theories, international law is only one form of “global law”. The 
standard joke is that it would be pedantic to deny that the World Cup at 
Association Football is “global”; to say the same of the ICC World Cup 
at cricket (16 nations) is stretching it; but the World Series (named 
after the New York World) or the instant Classic World series at 
baseball are just hyperbole. This can be met with the riposte that these 
competitions involve the best players or the best countries in the world 
in each sport. This hardly translates to law, although there is a 
developing practice of world rankings in respect of human rights, 
corruption, Rule of Law, and democracy.  
  To take another example of radical ambiguity: “global law firm” can 
mean one that offers services relating to all systems of law generally, or 
only in respect of some particular transnational (typically commercial 
or financial) fields. In this context “global” may refer to the client base, 
location of offices, types of specialised services offered, or just the 
largest law firms in the world (however they are geographically 
distributed) in terms of numbers of lawyers or numbers of countries in 
which they have offices. However, the most prominent table (“Lawyer 
Global 100” at http://www.thelawyer.co./global100/) ranks the world’s 
largest law firms in order of revenue. The term “global law school” can 
be treated indulgently as public relations puffing, provided it does not 
purport to produce “global lawyers”, students of all systems, 
mistresses/masters of none - a jibe levelled at John Austin inter alios.  
14  It is sometimes said that “English is the global language”. It is true 
that, for the time being, English is probably the most used language in 
transnational relations (politics, finance, commerce). However, a 
useful map distinguishes (a) countries where English is the first and 
only language of most people; (b) countries where English is a native 
language, but there is at least one other significant native language 
(e.g. Canada, South Africa), and (c) English is not native, but is the 
only or main official language, even if a (sometimes small) minority 
have a working knowledge of it. (a) is largely confined to the United 
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and reality (the International Criminal Court aspires to be global, 
but it is not there yet; the same applies to the idea of humankind as 
a community) or they are superficial, misleading, meaningless, 
speculative, exaggerated, ethnocentric, false, or a combination of 
these.15 
 
Here I shall use “global” to mean genuinely worldwide. I shall use 
different terms to refer to other levels of ordering and processes of 
increased interdependence, such as international, supra-national, 
transnational, regional, diasporic, and sub-national. In my view, a 
cosmopolitan discipline of law should be concerned with all levels 
of relations and legal ordering in the world as a whole, but a great 
many of these phenomena and processes operate at sub-global 
levels.  
 
My argument is not only that “global” and related terms applied to 
legal phenomena are radically ambiguous, but that many of the 
most interesting patterns relating to law in the world are sub-global 
in significant ways. The important point is that interdependence is a 
relative matter. A high proportion of processes loosely referred to as 
“global” operate at more limited sub-global levels. These levels, 
insofar as they are spatial,16 are not nested in a single vertical 
                                                                                                
States, the British Isles, parts of the Caribbean and most of Australasia 
(Zentai and Guszlev (1997)). Estimates vary considerably, but it seems 
unlikely that more than 15-20% of the world’s population has a 
working knowledge of English (the percentage of Internet users is 
higher). These figures illustrate the difference between “top-down” and 
“bottom-up” perspectives. For a survey of the issues, see Crystal 
(2008). An under-researched question is: what percentage of the 
population in each country can understand the language(s) of the state 
courts? 
15  See further GLT pp. 4-10, 245-9 and GJP pp. 13-18. 
16  Many such sources of information are empirical about actual people 
acting, discoursing, exhibiting attitudes that can be described and 
mapped. E.g. it may not be appropriate to ask: where is Islamic law?, 
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hierarchy - galactic, global, regional, national, sub-state, local and 
so on. (see Table I) Interdependence is largely a function of 
proximity or closeness: proximity can be spatial (geographical 
contiguity), colonial, military, linguistic, religious, historical, or 
legal. In other words, a picture of patterns of law in the world 
needs to take account of regions, empires, diasporas, alliances, 
trading partners, pandemics, legal traditions and families. The 
British Empire, the English-speaking world, religious and ethnic 
diasporas, the common law world, “the Arab world”, even so-called 
“World Wars” are all sub-global; so it is misleading to talk about 




                                                                                                
but if we ask where have there been significant communities of 
Muslims at particular times we have at least an empirical basis for 
hypotheses that can be tested empirically about the existence of 
significant institutionalized social practices followed by Muslims at 
different times and different places. For there already exist maps and 
historical atlases depicting not only the distribution of Muslims 
throughout the world at given times, but also diasporas, migration 
routes, and networks (e.g. Chaliand and Rageau (1995), Esposito 
(1999). On the dangers of over-using spatial metaphors in relation to 
law, see Woodman (2003), and Bovnik and Woodman (2009) 
discussed GJP Ch.3.3.c. 
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TABLE I LEVELS OF LAW 
 
Law is concerned with relations between subjects or persons (human, legal, 
unincorporated and otherwise) at a variety of levels, not just relations within a single 
nation state or society. One way of characterising such levels is essentially geographical:  
 
global  as with some environmental issues, a possible ius humanitatis) and, 
by extension, space law (e.g mineral rights on the moon); 
international  in the classic sense of relations between sovereign states and more 
broadly relations governed, for example, by human rights or refugee 
law; 
regional  for example, the European Union, European Convention on Human 
Rights, and the African Union 
transnational  for example, Islamic, Hindu, Jewish law, Gypsy law, transnational 
arbitration, a putative lex mercatoria, INTERNET law, and, more 
controversially, the internal governance of multi-national 
corporations, the Catholic Church, or institutions of organised crime; 
inter-communal  as in normative orders governing relations between religious 
communities, or Christian Churches, or different ethnic groups; 
territorial state  including the legal systems of nation states, and sub-national 
jurisdictions, such as Florida, Greenland, Quebec, and Northern 
Ireland;  
sub-state  e.g. subordinate legislation, (such as bye-laws of the Borough of 
Camden) or religious law officially recognised for limited purposes in 
a plural legal system; and 
non-state  including laws of subordinated peoples, such as native North 
Americans, or Maoris, or gypsies17 or illegal legal orders such as 
Santos’s Pasagarda law, the Southern People’s Liberation Army’s 
legal regime in Southern Sudan, and the “common law movement” 
of militias in the United States. 
Which of these orders should be classified as “law” or “legal” is essentially contested 
within legal theory and also depends on the context and purposes of the discourse. 
 
                                                 
17  Adapted from GLT Ch. 6 at 139. Recent studies of Romani (Gypsy) law 
have been pioneered by Walter Weyrauch, see Symposium (Spring, 
1997). On the Common Law Movement see Koniak (1996) and (1997). 
On Pasagarda see Santos (1995), discussed GJP at pp. 69-74. 
 
27 
These sub-global patterns are crucial - especially for lawyers. 
Treating all human rights law, and even public international law, 
as genuinely global in most respects is an exaggeration. It conflates 
universal, regional, multilateral and bilateral arrangements and 
regimes. It also blurs distinctions between aspiration and reality. It 
is difficult to generalise about legal phenomena across traditions 
and cultures, but insofar as there are reasonably clear patterns, 
most of them tend to follow sub-global arrangements: former 
empires, the European Union, the Hispanic-speaking world, the 
civil law tradition, the former Soviet bloc, alliances, trading blocs, 
religious and ethnic diasporas. For example, the spread of the 
common law is to be explained largely in terms of colonisation, 
imperialism, and recent American hegemony. The spread of 
Islamic law is more to do with patterns of migration. The 
transnational drug trade follows yet other patterns. 
 
Increased interest in “globalisation” in relation to law has already 
made the topic of diffusion/reception/ transplantation salient in 
comparative law and, more generally in our discipline. One of the 
factors explaining diffusion has been imperialism and colonialism. 
Law spreads with Empire. All of the great empires in history from 
Genghis Khan, the Roman Empire to the European empires of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been sub-global, 
occupying large swathes of territory, but never the whole planet. 
One has only to look at elementary maps of the Roman Empire, 
the Holy Roman Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the British Empire 
in their heydays to see that this is true. Similar points can be made 
about migration and the spread of language, religion, technology, 
legal traditions, all of which are relevant to law.  
 
We already have historical atlases, statistical tables, data bases and 
the like developed in other fields of enquiry that can provide at 
least broad overviews of significant sub-global patterns relating to 
legal phenomena. In the case of empires there is a vast body of 
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more detailed and more nuanced literature exploring stable 
patterns, dynamic processes and significant ruptures in detail and 
in depth. We can piggy-back on literature in history, political 
science, economics, geography, statistics, and several other social 
sciences in building up overviews and more detailed pictures and 
stories relating to law viewed from a global perspective. Law has 
lagged behind other disciplines in thinking globally, but we are not 
starting from scratch. 18  
 
It is important to be cautious about the use of “g-words” and to 
distinguish between different levels and spheres of relations and of 
ordering. However, it is sometimes useful to adopt a global 
perspective - to think in terms of the world as a whole, and to try to 
construct total pictures of legal phenomena and their distribution. 
This does not involve making any strong assumptions about 
uniformities or convergence. A global perspective involves looking 
at the world and humankind as a whole and setting accounts of 
particular phenomena in the context of broad geographical pictures 
and long historical time-frames. The world is becoming more 
interdependent and one needs to adopt a global perspective to 
understand these processes in relation to law. Our world still has 
relatively finite boundaries in a way that societies and nation states 
increasingly do not. Adopting a global perspective is mainly useful 
for setting a context for more particular, typically local or 
specialised, studies, which will still continue to be the main focus 
of our discipline. It also suggests fresh perspectives on familiar 
subjects. 
 
                                                 
18  See GJP at pp. 75-76. 
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The differential significance of “globalisation” for specialised fields of 
expertise  
 
Globalisation is already having, and will continue to have, a major 
impact on the landscape of specialised legal fields. But this is 
happening in varied ways. Some clear trends are already apparent. 
First, greater emphasis is being placed on established transnational 
fields, such as public international law, regional law, 
environmental law, international trade and finance (including lex 
mercatoria and Islamic banking and finance). New transnational 
fields are emerging, such as Internet law,19 procurement,20 
international taxation, and transitional justice.21 Since 9/11 
international criminal law and procedure have been given a boost, 
emergency and ant-terrorism laws have diffused and proliferated.22 
From a global perspective the North-South divide is of crucial 
importance, and this makes issues of world poverty and “law and 
development” (however characterised) much more central for the 
discipline of law and legal theory than they have been in the past.23 
As was noted above, since about 1990 there has seen a spate of 
“rethinkings” in several transnational fields.24 
 
A second obvious development is an increased recognition of the 
legal dimensions of issues and phenomena that are genuinely 
global, such as climate change, other environmental issues, radical 
poverty, the common heritage of mankind, migration, war, 
international crime, terrorism, pandemics, and the media. 
                                                 
19  E.g. Froomkin (2002) Christopher Reed (2004); Polanski (2007). 
20  McCrudden, (2007a). 
21  E.g. Teitel (2000), Bell et al. (2007) See also the webpage of the 
Transitional Justice Institute (University of Ulster).  
 http:www//transitional justice.Ulster.ac.uk. 
22  Scheppele (2010 and forthcoming). 
23  On different conceptions and histories of “Law and Development” see 
McAuslan (2004) and GJP at pp. 324-29. 
24  See above n. 8. 
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Third, and less obvious, there is a growing emphasis on the 
transnational dimensions of subjects previously perceived as 
domestic, such as contract, criminal law, family law, intellectual 
property, and labour law. For example, in family law, issues 
relating to the interests and rights of children in respect of labour, 
custody, adoption, abduction across national borders, and the sex 
trade.25 In 2005 a Workshop at Pacific McGeorge Law School on 
“Globalizing the Law Curriculum” led to the launch of a series of 
short readers “designed to facilitate the introduction of 
international and comparative law issues into basic law school 
courses in the United States.”26  
 
Fourth, increasing attention is being paid to diffusion of law 
generally, and specifically of religious and customary practices 
through migration, their interface with municipal state law in 
Northern countries, and the fact that religious and ethnic minority 
communities have institutionalised social practices that are not 
officially recognised or are recognised only intermittently.27  
 
Finally, today no scholar, or even student, of law can focus solely 
on the domestic law of a single jurisdiction. Every law student in 
the United Kingdom - and, no doubt, in most of Continental 
                                                 
25  E.g. the cover of Estin and Stark (2007). 
26  The initiative was spearheaded by Professor Franklin Gevurtz and the 
series is published by Thomson/West, St Paul, Minnesota. See for 
example, John Spranklin, Raymond Coletta, and M.C. Mirow Global 
Issues in Property Law (2006) and Julie A. Davies and Paul T. Hayden 
(2008) Global Issues in Tort Law, and Estin and Stark (2007). By early 
2008 ten short books had been published in the series. A similar 
initiative is under consideration by the UK Centre for Legal Education 
in respect of Islamic law. The point is to provide materials that can be 
integrated into mainstream “domestic” law courses. 
27  E.g. Pearl and Menski, (1998) Ch. 3; Ballard (ed.) (1994) and (2006); 
Yilmaz (2005) Bano (2007a and b) On religious minorities in Europe 
see GJP Ch. 13, n. 110. 
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Europe - encounters European Community Law and, directly or 
indirectly, the European Convention on Human Rights. Our 
academic literature on the municipal law of England and Wales 
draws heavily, though unevenly, on sources from the United 
States, the Commonwealth and beyond. So transnational and 
cross-level comparison is already embedded in our local academic 
legal cultures.28 We are in an important sense all comparatists 
now, even if most of us lack sophistication in comparative method. 
Comparative law is increasingly more like a way of life than a 
marginal subject for a few specialists. The processes of 
transnationalisation significantly increase this trend. 
 
Law is a participant-oriented discipline largely concerned with the 
details of immediate, practical, local problems. There are fears that 
enthusiastic responses to globalisation may lead to legal 
scholarship and education becoming detached from its roots in a 
particular legal tradition and local legal practice. This may, indeed, 
be a danger.29 But legal practice in a multi-cultural society needs to 
some extent to be multicultural; concern with civil liberties and 
human rights cannot in its nature be purely local; and, of course, 
we are citizens of the European Union and the Council of Europe. 
Our academic cultures have never been entirely parochial 
(remember Roman Law and Grotius!), and they are steadily 
becoming more cosmopolitan. Any legal scholar needs to be aware 
of the changing scene and has to make difficult judgements about 
                                                 
28  The extensive American debate on citation of foreign authorities in 
American Federal Courts is tangential to this point. There are symbolic 
reasons for not citing foreign sources as authority and practical 
reasons for limiting the range of sources that may be explicitly referred 
to in arguments in court, but American legal culture - despite some 
tendencies to parochialism - is not, and never has been, immune from 
foreign influences. For a balanced discussion of an overblown issue 
see McCrudden (2007b).  
29  Such concerns are discussed in GJP Ch.12.2 (b). 
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balancing the local and particular with broader concerns and 
contexts.  
 
Some jobs for jurisprudence 
 
One can spot the kinds of trends outlined in the last section 
without much help from theory, but can jurisprudence add 
anything to these common-sense observations? That depends on 
one’s conception of jurisprudence. In my view jurisprudence is the 
general or more abstract part of law as a discipline. It is usefully 
conceived as both a heritage and an activity. 30  
 
As an activity it can perform a wide range of functions, including 
elucidating concepts, formulating hypotheses, addressing 
fundamental philosophical issues (‘high theory’), intellectual 
history, exploring connections with neighbouring disciplines, and 
constructing syntheses and overarching theories. While all of these 
are relevant to thinking about the implications of globalisation for 
understanding law, two functions of theorising are more 
immediately relevant to the central question of this lecture. Firstly, 
one can identify particular theorists or texts that are most directly 
                                                 
30  Ibid at ch 1.3. “General” in the term “general jurisprudence” is used in 
several different senses to mean (a) universal, (b) transcending legal 
cultures and traditions; (c) in some parts of Continental Europe as a 
form of middle order theory between doctrinal analysis and abstract 
legal philosophy (théorie génèrale du droit) or (d) the most abstract 
part of legal theory, i.e. legal philosophy. The term is used here in 
sense (b), i.e. any theorising that significantly traverses legal traditions, 
cultures or even jurisdictions. This is much more extensive than 
“global” jurisprudence as it covers intermediate levels of ordering and 
theorising whose reach is sub-global (e.g. much of Western 
jurisprudence). Some analytical legal philosophers have appropriated 
the term to refer abstract theorising to all possible legal systems (e.g. 
Green (2005)), but this is both very narrow and involves a misreading 
of history. See GLT Ch. 2.  
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relevant to interpreting the present scene. Secondly, one can ask: to 
what extent are standard, taken-for-granted assumptions 
underlying our received tradition of academic law, or my 
specialism, or this topic, being challenged by globalisation?  
 
To deal with the first point briefly:31 here I can only talk with 
confidence about the Anglo-American tradition. Surveys in UK, 
Australia and Canada suggest that taught jurisprudence has a 
discernible mainstream or canon:32 Dworkin, Hart, Kelsen, 
Natural Law (e.g. Finnis), Rawls and Raz feature on nearly all lists, 
with Austin, Bentham, Fuller, Holmes, Llewellyn, MacCormick, 
Posner, critical legal studies, autopoiesis and feminist 
jurisprudence forming a second, but significant, tier. Whatever 
their differences, almost all of these thinkers have treated the 
domestic legal systems of sovereign nation states as their central, 
sometimes exclusive, concern. Some, with varying degrees of 
unease, have tried to accommodate public international law and 
European Community law. Almost none have treated religious 
law, or other forms of non-state law, as central to their concerns.33  
 
Recently, largely in response to globalisation several notable 
theorists have climbed on the shoulders of their predecessors and 
explored how far their ideas need adjusting to fit a global 
                                                 
31  This is a major theme in GJP, see especially Chapters 1.3, 4, 5 and 13.  
32  This “canon” is based on surveys by Cotterrell and Woodliffe (1974), 
Barnett and Yach (1985) (both UK) and Barnett (1995) (extended to 
Australia and Canada). They need updating. American courses are 
more eclectic, but the standard students’ works suggest a similar 
pattern, with more emphasis on trends in American Jurisprudence. 
Generally, Continental European thought, especially critical theory, has 
gained ground in some Anglophone courses since 1995. 
33  Llewellyn’s ‘law jobs’ theory can be interpreted as a partial exception. 
See GJP, at Ch 4.2-3.  
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perspective.34 Brian Tamanaha has accepted Hart’s positivist 
premises - the separation thesis and the social sources thesis - but 
pared away all of Hart’s criteria of identification in order to 
construct a broadened conception of law that would include several 
forms of non-state and religious law, but which differentiates it 
from other social rules and institutions, such as those involved in 
the governance of hospitals, schools, and sports leagues.35 Thomas 
Pogge, a former pupil of Rawls, has followed and refined most 
elements of Rawls’ theory of justice. However, rejecting the notion 
of nation states or societies as self-contained units, he has 
produced a radically different theory of global justice than that 
outlined in Rawls’ The Law of Peoples.36 Peter Singer has done 
something similar for Benthamite utilitarianism, applying it to 
current issues in international ethics.37 I have tried to do much the 
same for Karl Llewellyn.38 Working more in a tradition of world 
history than historical jurisprudence, Patrick Glenn’s Legal 
Traditions of the World provides a theoretically sophisticated, if not 
uncontroversial, overview of the major legal traditions.39 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, building on a mixture of Marx, 
Weber, and post-modernism, has produced a striking account of ‘a 
new legal common sense’.40 Thus a new generation of jurists - 
notably Tamanaha, Santos, and Glenn, - and some philosophers, 
for example, Pogge, and Singer - are producing a stock of globally 
                                                 
34  Cf. Kipling’s poem “The Disciple” which ends “But his own disciple 
shall wound him worst of all”. 
35  Tamanaha, (2001), discussed in GJP, at ch. 4.1. 
36  Pogge (1989) and (2002). (2002); Rawls (1999). These are discussed 
in GJP at Chap. 5.7. 
37  See, e.g. Singer, (2004) and (1993) discussed in GJP at ch 5. 6. In 
writing about human rights Singer is more “ecumenical” than 
Bentham (id. at p. 145). 
38  GJP Chapter 4. 
39  Glenn (2nd edn, 2004), discussed in a Symposium edited by N Foster 
(2006). See now Glenn (2010).  
40  Santos (1995) and (2002) discussed in GLT, at ch 8 and GJB, at ch 9. 
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oriented theories about aspects of law while maintaining 
discernible continuities with our general jurisprudential heritage.  
  
One of the main functions of legal theory is internal critique, that 
is articulating and subjecting to critical scrutiny assumptions and 
presuppositions of our academic legal culture, or of specialised 
enclaves within it, or even the received wisdom on particular 
topics. This, I suggest, is one useful approach for a specialist legal 
scholar reflecting on the implications of globalisation for her own 
field or topics of specialised interest.  
 
The individual specialist 
 
Apart from being aware of these general trends, how can the 
individual scholar approach the question: what are the implications 
of increased transnationalisation and interdependence for my work 
as a specialist? I suggest that one way is to adopt the methods of 
internal critique, that is critical examination of one’s own working 
assumptions. Tables II-IV contain three examples of this kind of 
approach in descending order of generality. Each sets up an “ideal 
type” of general assumptions and tendencies in given areas of 
study and invites consideration of how it is being challenged in a 
new context. These examples apply to three different levels: Table 
II is an ideal type of some widespread tendencies in Western 
traditions of academic law; Table III is an ideal type of, a field, viz. 
traditional mainstream micro-comparative law; Table IV constructs 
and criticises a naïve model of legal writings about reception/ 
transplants/ diffusion, a topic of increasing importance within 
comparative law. 
 
Let me first make some general comments on these: 
 
First these are not general descriptions of traditions and 
tendencies, they are ideal types or models. There are, of course, 
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many exceptions and variants. The ideas are recognisable, but not 
universal or uncontested. The argument in the present context is 
that insofar as such assumptions are in fact made they are under 
challenge in the context of the complex processes we loosely refer 
to as globalisation.  
 
Second, this use of ideal types is a flexible tool. There is nothing 
fixed about the particular points and formulations in these 
examples. I used different methods for constructing each of these 
examples. For example, “the naïve model of diffusion” (Table IV) 
takes as its starting-point the first article I ever wrote - I asked: what 
did I assume and how well do these assumptions characterise 
diffusion processes? It was a (so far unsuccessful) attempt to 
launch a new movement: the Self-critical Legal Studies Movement. 
Table III is based on a literature survey of what mainstream 
comparative lawyers had said about their subject up to about 1995 - 
i.e. just before there was a burst of self-criticism within the sub-
discipline.  
 
The model of Western Traditions of academic law (Table II) stems 
from thinking about a global perspective i.e. it works back from 
thinking about globalisation. It is a summation of points of 
challenge that I have identified inductively in over ten years of 
thinking about globalisation and law and general jurisprudence.41 
The central argument identifies five main themes: 
                                                 
41  Table II follows the text in GJP. Each of these topics is discussed in 
GJP and the list follows the structure of the book, in which Part A gives 
a broad overview of the domains of General Jurisprudence, following 
the traditional broad categorisations of analytical, normative and 
empirical jurisprudence. Parts B and C deal selectively with topics that 
illustrate and concretize the general approach. So, of course, the list 
could be extended considerably - e.g. well-worn topics, such as the 
fragmentation of international law or neglected topics, such as 
problems of law in multi-lingual societies or transnational contexts. On 
some other possible agendas see GJP pp. 446-9.  
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 the whole Western tradition of academic law is based on 
several kinds of assumptions that need to be critically 
examined in a changing context;  
 we lack concepts and data to generalise about legal 
phenomena in the world as a whole: analytic concepts that 
can transcend, at least to some extent, different legal 
traditions and cultures;  
 comparison is the first step to generalisation and more 
sophisticated and expansive approaches to comparative law 
are critical for the development of a healthy discipline of law  
 we need more sophisticated normative theories that are 
well-informed and sensitive to pluralism of beliefs and 
differences between value systems; and,  
 especially, we need improved empirical understandings of 
how legal doctrines, institutions, and practices operate in 
“the real world”. 
 
Fourth, this is not a negative critique. I belong to the Western 
tradition of academic law; I was taught by and admire some of the 
pioneers of classical comparative law - Max Rheinstein, Harry 
Lawson, Barry Nicholas; - and I think that there is much of value in 
the legal literature on transplants/reception. Indeed, it is almost as 
much a pity that social scientists interested in diffusion have 
ignored the legal literature as that legal scholars have largely 
ignored the vast and varied social science literature on diffusion. 
Two bodies of literature have been talking past each other.42 A 
large part of my own work rests on assumptions that approximate 
to my ideal type of Western traditions - for example, when I write 
about evidence or legal education or legal archives, I usually work 
within a model of countries as discrete units and of 
                                                 
42  See Twining (2005). 
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municipal/state law as the main kind of law.43 We cannot break 
away very far from our intellectual roots, but we can subject them 
to critical examination. 
 
Let us look more closely at my Table II - standard assumptions 
underlying the mainstream of Western traditions of academic 
law.44 My thesis is that insofar as an individual scholar holds these 
assumptions, she needs to ask whether they are under serious 
challenge in respect of her specialised area of expertise. This list 
does not claim to be comprehensive and can be extended. It refers 
to some general ideas that are recognisable and widespread, but by 
no means universal, within our traditions. None has gone 
unquestioned and some have been the subject of extensive 
contestation. They are loosely related and together constitute an 
“ideal type” to which our inherited assumptions and attitudes 
broadly approximate. This is no more than a device or sounding-
board for taking stock of “the state of the art” in a given field. An 
individual scholar can ask how far these ideas are important and 
operative in her particular field of interest and in her own attitudes 
and practices. The suggestion is that, insofar as they are important, 
adopting a global perspective puts them into question. 
 
                                                 
43  However, interest in globalisation has influenced my work in these 
areas, see, for example, in relation to legal education, Twining (1996) 
and (2001). 
44  Adapted from GJP Ch.1. 
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TABLE II  WESTERN TRADITIONS OF ACADEMIC LAW:  
SOME SIMPLISTIC ASSUMPTIONS 
 
(a) that law consists of two principal kinds of ordering: municipal state law 
and public international law (classically conceived as ordering the 
relations between states) (“the Westphalian duo”); 
(b) that nation-states, societies, and legal systems are very largely closed, 
self-contained entities that can be studied in isolation; 
(c) that modern law and modern jurisprudence are secular, now largely 
independent of their historical-cultural roots in the Judaeo-Christian 
traditions; 
(d) That modern state law is primarily rational-bureaucratic and 
instrumental, performing certain functions and serving as a means for 
achieving particular social ends; 
(e) that law is best understood through “top-down” perspectives of rulers, 
officials, legislators, and elites with the points of view of users, 
consumers, victims and other subjects being at best marginal;  
(f) that the main subject-matters of the discipline of law are ideas and 
norms rather than the empirical study of social facts;  
(g) that modern state law is almost exclusively a Northern (European/ 
Anglo-American) creation, diffused through most of the world via 
colonialism, imperialism, trade, and latter-day post-colonial influences; 
(h) that the study of non-Western legal traditions is a marginal and 
unimportant part of Western academic law; 
(i) that the fundamental values underlying modern law are universal, 
although the philosophical foundations are diverse. 
 
 
A lot of these are familiar and are not or should not be 
controversial. Academic law has been changing rapidly for some 
years. For example, it is now commonplace that sovereignty, the 
territoriality of law, legal and normative pluralism, the 
fragmentation of international law, regionalism, diffusion, human 
rights, and aspects of environmental law are becoming more 
salient as topics deserving attention. So this is as much trend-
spotting as trend-setting. Table II suggests some further points of 
challenge  about secularism, bottom-up perspectives, the purpose, 
nature and scope of comparative law for example. All of these 
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topics are discussed at length in General Jurisprudence. Here I shall 
confine myself to some brief remarks about the inter-related topics 
of non-state law, pluralism, “surface law”, and ethnocentrism.  
 
a) Conceptions of law: The Westphalian Duo  
 
From a global perspective a reasonably inclusive picture of law in 
the world would encompass various forms of non-state law, 
especially different kinds of religious and customary law that fall 
outside ‘the Westphalian duo’ of state (municipal) law and classical 
public international law dealing with relations between states.45 A 
map of law in the world that leaves out religious law, important 
forms of indigenous, customary or Cthonic law, emerging forms 
such as lex mercatoria and other examples of “soft law” at sub-, 
supra- and international levels, just leaves out too much. There are 
of course problems of conceptualisation and strong claims about 
the importance and distinctiveness of state law, but it is difficult to 
believe that anyone seriously maintains that such phenomena do 
not exist or should not be a concern of legal scholarship. Non-state 
law is not important only in the Global South or non-Western 
countries. In Western countries with significant migrant 
communities it is an increasingly salient phenomenon, not only in 
respect of interaction with national law, but also in its own right. 
Can a teacher of municipal law in UK or the Netherlands 
concerned with housing finance, or consumer credit, or small 
businesses today justifiably ignore Islamic banking and finance? 
Riba is now part of the picture both in respect of municipal law 
and of institutionalised social practices that may or may not be 
recognised as having legal effect by the state.46 The same applies to 
                                                 
45  GJP Ch 3 and 12. 
46  The skewed public debate on recognition of “shari’a” for limited 
purposes proposed by the Archbishop of Canterbury in February, 2008 
(on which see Bano, (2008) obscured the fact that the judiciary of 
England and Wales has for many years been given guidance on how to 
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family law, criminal law, administrative law and so on, but in quite 
complex ways.47 That may be obvious to this audience, but to what 
extent is it reflected in our practices of legal education? 
 
b) Monism and normative and legal pluralism 
 
In this context, legal monism, sometimes referred to as “state 
centralism”, maintains that sovereign states claim and exercise a 
monopoly of legal authority and legitimate force within the 
territory over which they have jurisdiction.48 However, if one 
accepts some conception of non-state law this opens the way to 
recognition of situations of legal pluralism, that is the co-existence 
of two or more legal orders in the same time-space context.  
 
A great deal of controversy, much of it unnecessary, surrounds the 
topic of legal pluralism.49 First, there is a matter of terminology. It 
is important to distinguish between (a) “state legal pluralism” 
(recognition within a state legal system of different bodies of law, 
                                                                                                
take account of and inform themselves about practices, customs and 
beliefs of ethnic and religious minorities: see Judicial Studies Board, 
Handbook on Ethnic Minority Issues (1999-) www.jsboard.co.uk.  
47  In England it is recognised that religious and customary norms of 
minorities impinge on a wide range of legal fields, not only, or even 
mainly, family law. See Judicial Studies Board (1999-), and Ballard 
(2006).  
48  “Part of the ideological baggage of the modern nation-state is the idea 
that the state is the source of all law, properly so called, and that law is 
(or at least ought to be) exclusive of other forms of regulation and is 
uniform for all persons”. Griffiths (2001), cf. Griffiths (2003). 
49  I have argued elsewhere that legal pluralism is usefully conceived as a 
species of normative pluralism, that it exists as a social fact, that from a 
global perspective legal pluralism is an important phenomenon, and 
that some of the puzzlements and controversies are either unnecessary 
or relate to wider issues, about epistemology or the concept of law, or 
the nature of rules and rule-systems. (GLT 82-88, 224-33). See now 
GJP Ch.17 and Twining (2010). 
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such as religious or customary law, applying to members of 
particular groups for given purposes); 50 (b) “legal polycentricity” 
(the eclectic use of sources in different sectors of a state legal 
system);51 and (c) empirical legal pluralism, as the co-existence in 
fact of discrete or semi-autonomous legal orders in the same time-
space context.  
 
Here we are mainly concerned with (c). The problem of “the 
definitional stop” - where to draw a line between legal and non-
legal, if one adopts a broad conception of law - has re-surfaced in 
the context of debates about legal pluralism.52 This is not a specific 
puzzle about legal pluralism as such, but is part of the perennial 
topic of how best to conceptualise law. For the individual scholar 
whether a particular normative order or other phenomenon is 
categorised as “legal” is usually of secondary importance. The 
question for her is: what normative orders or social practices or 
social norms in addition to state law are important for 
understanding my particular field? For example, it is 
commonplace in diffusion studies that imported state law almost 
inevitably interacts with pre-existing local normative orders and 
practices, including state law, so-called “unofficial law”, various 
customary practices and the culture(s) of the local legal 
                                                 
50  E.g. Kenya recognizes shari’a, some other forms of religious law, and 
customary law as part of state law for certain purposes. The epic 
Otieno burial case vividly illustrates some of the tensions and 
complexities of state legal pluralism. See van Doren (1988). The classic 
text on state legal pluralism is Hooker (1975). Griffiths (2001) refers to 
this as “juridical legal pluralism”, which he contrasts with “empirical 
legal pluralism”, the idea developed mainly in legal anthropology and 
socio-legal studies. 
51  See, e.g. Petersen and Zahle (eds.) (1995) (exploring the varying uses 
of sources of law in different branches of administration of a single 
state). 
52  This is a particular concern of Tamanaha (1993), (2001), and (2008). 
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profession.53 The important fact is the interaction, not how these 
various normative orders, rules or practices are categorised. What 
is of more theoretical interest is to what extent a given normative 
order can be treated as a discrete unit (the problem of 
individuation) and how different kinds of interaction can be 
described (differentiation of modes of “interlegality”).54 
 
From a global perspective, legal pluralism is a very important 
phenomenon at all levels of ordering, both within and across 
levels. If one separates out broader issues that belong to the 
general theory of norms, or problems of conceptualising law, or 
ideological issues about “the state”, it is relatively straightforward to 
conceive of legal pluralism as a social fact. Its scope depends in 
large part on what conception of law one adopts in this context. 
Once the broader theoretical issues are distinguished, most of the 
interesting questions about legal pluralism are either empirical or 
concerned with policy questions about the relationship between 
the state and non-state law.55 They need to be set in some broader 
intellectual framework, including that of orthodox jurisprudence.56 
Legal and normative pluralism is now quite widely recognised as a 
significant phenomenon in most transnational subjects. In 
multicultural societies - which today means most societies - it is 
                                                 
53  A nice example is recounted by Brian Tamanaha. When he was 
Assistant Attorney-General of Yap (in Melanesia), there was an 
“official” state legal system but it was almost completely ignored by the 
general population, who followed their own customary practices. 
Tamanaha’s superior suggested that as he did not seem to have much 
to do, he might draft a new Banking law. The point of the story is that 
banking law precedes banks. In Yap this might have been an example of 
a nearly “blank slate” - although the locals may well have had norms 
relating to credit; however, if this had arisen in a predominantly 
Muslim country, riba might have become a major issue.  
54  See GLT Ch.17. 1. 
55  See now Twining (2010). 
56  Von Benda-Beckmann (2002) at p. 74. 
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increasingly relevant to the study of domestic law, but in different 
ways for different fields.57 
 
c) Doctrinal and institutional perspectives on law: the issue of surface 
law  
 
In the Anglo-American legal tradition rivalry between doctrinal and 
institutional conceptions of law and between ‘black letter’ 
(expository) and socio-legal approaches to legal studies is of long-
standing. On the whole, the mainstream has been dominated by 
doctrinal conceptions and approaches, but not to the complete 
exclusion of empirical legal studies. There is widespread sympathy 
for the idea of law as institutionalised normative order58 or as 
institutionalised social practice59 even from those whose main 
concern is with doctrine. To date empirical comparative law and 
other kinds of transnational socio-legal work are not well-
developed.60 However, as comparative law, diffusion, and issues 
about convergence, harmonisation and unification of laws become 
more salient, it is more than ever important to penetrate beneath 
the surface of official legal doctrine to reach the realities of all 
forms of law as social practices. To what extent are Alan Watson’s 
generalisations, or claims that legal systems are converging, or 
projects for unification or harmonisation or judicial reform only 
dealing with ‘surface law’ - that is with formal texts that tell us little 
or nothing about how they are or will be interpreted, adapted, 
applied, implemented, enforced, used, or ignored?61 In short, from 
information provided merely by legal texts and expositions of 
doctrine, we do not know to what extent they make any difference 
                                                 
57  On the Global Issues series edited by Professor Gevurtz, see above n. 26. 
58  MacCormick (2008).  
59  GJP, at ch 4. 
60  Ibid at ch 8. 
61  Ibid at ch 10. 
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in practice, let alone transform, economic, social or other relations 
and behaviour. 
 
‘Surface law’ does not mean law that is only on the surface. Rather 
our discipline has not been very good at penetrating behind the 
official texts and doctrine to find out how they operate in practice 
in given contexts. And to what extent, if we adopt a conception of 
non-state law, are there significant arcane, unnoticed or invisible 
legal orders that so far have escaped the attention of legal 
scholars?62 In short, concern with the realities of ‘law in action’ is 
as important from a global perspective as it is for more traditional 
understandings of law. 
 
d) Ethnocentrism, parochialism and ignorance of other traditions  
 
Ethnocentrism means ‘culturally biased judgement’63 or ‘a 
tendency to look at other cultures through the filter of one’s own 
cultural presuppositions’.64 Our academic tradition has tended to 
be ignorant, even ethnocentric, about other legal traditions and 
belief systems. Their study has been treated as marginal at best. As 
with other branches of jurisprudence, Western normative 
jurisprudence has been quite insular. Yet Western Jurisprudence 
has a long tradition of universalism in ethics - witness, for 
example, Natural law, classical utilitarianism, Kantianism and 
modern theories of human rights.65 Nearly all such theories have 
been developed and debated with at most only tangential reference 
                                                 
62  Romani (or ‘Gypsy’) law and the Common Law Movement are 
examples of previously unnoticed normative orders that have only been 
recently caught the attention of legal scholars. See, e.g., Weyrauch (ed.) 
(1997); Koniak,(1996) and (1997).  
63  Levine (2001). 
64  Barfield (ed.) (1997) 55. See also GJP, at ch 5 n 25. 
65  On different meanings of ‘universalism’ see GJP, at ch 5.2. Here it 
refers to claims that a given moral principle applies to all humans at all 
times and in all places. 
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to and in almost complete ignorance of or indifference to the 
religious and moral beliefs and traditions of the rest of 
humankind. When differing cultural values are discussed, even the 
agenda of issues has a stereotypically Western bias.66  
 
As the discipline of law becomes more cosmopolitan we need to 
become better acquainted with the leading thinkers and salient 
ideas and controversies in other legal traditions and to extend our 
orthodox canon of juristic texts. Until now non-Western law and 
jurisprudence has been considered the province of specialists. 
Despite criticisms of ‘orientalism’,67 there has been some excellent 
work by Western scholars on Islamic, Hindu, Bhuddist and 
Chinese legal thought.68 To a lesser extent, there are accessible 
writings by contemporary ‘Southern’ writers. As a modest first step 
in that direction I have undertaken a study of the general 
approaches to human rights of four ‘Southern jurists’: Francis 
Deng, Abdullahi An Na’im, Yash Ghai and Upendra Baxi.69 All 
four deserve to be better known, but this is a limited exercise as 
these particular individuals were all trained in the common law, 
write in English, and belong to the immediate post-Independence 
generation. They provide a useful bridge to other viewpoints, but 
there are many others, including not least Southern feminists and 
prominent jurists whose work has not been translated into 
                                                 
66  For example, in discussions of Islam focusing on Islamic 
punishments, the veil, and even female genital mutilation (not an 
Islamic idea), rather than commercial morality (eg, riba) or the relief of 
poverty (eg, zakah) or international law (siyar), from which the West 
might learn from Islam. 
67  On ‘orientalism’ see Edward Said, Orientalism, (1994); for a robust, but 
selective defence, see Irwin, (2006), cf. Perrin (1999). 
68  There are useful select bibliographies in Glenn (2010), Menski (2006) 
and Huxley (2002).  
69  GJP, at ch 13 and Twining, (ed.), (2010) Human Rights, Southern Voices 
(a Reader) (Cambridge University Press). 
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English. Again the relevance of this kind of development will vary 
between specialisms. 
 
TABLE III THE COUNTRY AND WESTERN MODEL OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW, 1945-199070 
 
(ii) The primary subject-matter is the positive laws and ‘official’ legal systems 
of nation states (municipal legal systems). 
 
(iii) It focuses almost exclusively on Western capitalist societies in Europe and the 
United States, with little or no detailed consideration of ‘the East’ (former and 
surviving socialist countries, including China), the ‘South’ (poorer countries) 
and richer countries of the Pacific Basin.71 
 
(iv) It is concerned mainly with the similarities and differences between 
common law and civil law, as exemplified by ‘parent’ traditions or systems, 
notably France and Germany for civil law, England and the United States for 
common law.  
 
(v) It focuses almost entirely on legal doctrine. 
 
(vi) It focuses in practice largely on private law, especially the law of obligations, 




The concern is with description and analysis rather than evaluation and 
prescription, except that one of the main uses of ‘legislative comparative law’ is 
typically claimed to be the lessons to be learned from foreign solutions to 
‘shared problems’ – a claim that is theoretically problematic.72 
                                                 
70  This section is a condensed version of several papers, especially 
Twining (2000b), GLT Ch. 7, and Twining (2007). For an interesting 
critique of my views on comparative law from a Nietzchean perspective 
see Salman (2009).  
71  During the period of the Cold War, a major exception to (ii) was Soviet 
or Socialist law, which was treated as belonging to ‘Comparative Law’ 
in a way in which African, Indian, Islamic and Hindu law were not. 




In an earlier study, conducted in the mid-1990s, I used a similar 
approach to identify the underlying assumptions about a single 
field, comparative law.73 I analysed what leading comparatists had 
said about their subject in the period 1945-1990, emphasising that 
in practice comparative work was very much richer and broader. 
This analysis resulted in a similar ideal type of mainstream 
conceptualisations of the field, which, for obvious reasons, I 
labelled ‘The Country and Western Tradition’ (see Table III). The 
purpose was to show that the focus of mainstream comparative law 
had been narrow in several respects. In a period of agonised 
introspection internal critics (for example, Watson,74 Ewald75 and 
Legrand76) had raised important questions about the philosophical 
underpinnings, the methods, the purposes and the biases of 
traditional comparative law, but they themselves worked within the 
confines of the Country and Western Tradition, largely restricted to 
municipal law (especially private law) of modern Western states 
within only two legal traditions, common law and civil law.  
 
The result of this narrow conceptualisation of the field was that 
large areas of existing scholarly concern, including religious law, 
African law, human rights, and “law and development”, were not 
recognised as belonging to “comparative law”, and that nearly all 
examples of supra-state, sub-state, and non-state law were similarly 
ignored. There was some justification for this in the pioneering 
days after World War II, when a relatively new subject had to 
establish its relevance, its respectability, and its utility within 
mainstream academic law, but this artificially narrow model did 
not seem appropriate in an era of globalisation. 
                                                 
73  Twining, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Theory, The Country and 
Western Tradition’ in Edge (2000); cf GLT, at ch 7. Although first 
published in 2000, the basic work was done in 1995-97. 
74  Watson (1974/1993). 
75  Ewald (1995a) and (1995b). 
76  Legrand (1995) and (2003).  
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Since 1990 the field of comparative has expressly expanded to 
include a much wider range of legal fields (e.g. constitutional law, 
civil rights, responses to terrorism), comparisons at supra-state 
levels (e.g. comparative international law, regional human rights 
regimes), cross-level comparison (e.g tribunals at different levels of 
ordering), comparison within legal traditions (e.g. comparative 
common law and civil law) and interactions between state and non-
state law.77 In the same period, multiple perspectives have been 
brought to bear - economic analysis, diffusion theory, critical legal 
theory, feminism, for example - and, as legal scholarship has 
generally become more transnational, the claim has been made 
that “we are all comparatists now”.78 
 
It would not be surprising if this bewildering combination of 
internal critique, rapid diversification, and a possible loss of special 
status has provoked a crisis of identity and a possible loss of 
confidence among comparatists. Clearly considerable adjustments 
are needed and are being made. However, my own view is that 
there is still room for specialists in comparative law for several 
reasons: First, while every legal scholar needs to be aware of 
elementary pitfalls in making comparisons - this should be part of 
basic legal method - to become a skilled comparatist requires a 
long apprenticeship and special expertise and sensibilities.79 It also 
requires some sophistication in respect of theory. Second, only a 
few scholars can be expected to be genuinely learned in two or 
more different legal traditions, or even legal systems - there is still 
room for specialised knowledge of different kinds. Third, as our 
discipline becomes more cosmopolitan, comparative law as a 
                                                 
77  The expansion of the focus of comparative law is lavishly illustrated by 
Legrand and Munday (2003) and Örücü and Nelken (2007).  
78  I have made such a claim (e.g. Twining (2000a), but it has sometimes 
been misunderstood to mean that there is no room for specialist 
courses, organisations or literature on comparative law.  
79  Rheinstein (1968). 
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method, perspective or even a way of life, becomes central to the 
task of understanding law. One crucial reason is that, as John 
Stuart Mill put it, comparison is one step on the road to 
generalisation;80 and, as I have argued above, our discipline is as 
yet ill-equipped to make many sensible generalisations about legal 
phenomena across legal traditions and other patterns, let alone 
world-wide. There is accordingly more room than ever for 
specialists who can claim to be “comparative lawyers”.81 
 
In the present context, the purpose of this section is to illustrate 
how the approach advocated here can be applied to critically 
examining any specialised field as it is conceived and practised in a 
particular time and place. Of course, this is quite common in “re-
thinking” a field from the point of view of a fresh perspective, such 
as feminism, economic analysis or deconstruction. So far as 
globalisation is concerned this kind of internal critique is especially 
important in respect of asking about the appropriate geographical 
scope and criteria of relevance for one’s enquiry. 
 
From a global perspective a map of state law in the world inevitably 
depicts a continuous story of interaction and diffusion. Legal 
traditions have interacted with each other throughout history.82 
Until the mid-twentieth century, imperialism and colonialism were 
probably the main, but not the only, engines of diffusion of state 
law. In comparative law it has sometimes been assumed that 
modern state law is almost exclusively a Northern (European/ 
Anglo-American) creation, spread through nearly all the world via 
colonialism, imperialism, trade and more recent neo-colonial 
influences. This provided one justification for concentrating largely 
                                                 
80  Mill (1843). 
81  It does not follow from this that comparative law needs to be conceived 
as an autonomous sub-discipline, any more than this is sensible for 
jurisprudence or legal theory (see Twining (2000b) at pp. 69-71. 
82  Glenn (2010).  
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on ‘parent’ legal systems. In the post-colonial era the processes of 
diffusion have been perceived to be more varied and there is a 
growing realisation that diffusion of law does not necessarily lead 
to convergence, harmonisation, or unification of laws.83 Moreover, 
if one includes important examples of non-state law, the picture 
becomes very much more complex. 
 
Diffusion is now84widely recognised as a central topic in 
comparative law.85 Adopting the method of internal critique, I have 
tried to show that until recently much of the legal literature on 
legal transplants/reception, which contains some excellent studies, 
has been based on some simplistic assumptions.86 Taking one of 
my own early publications I demonstrated that my account was 
based on a naïve model of reception that postulates a paradigm 
case with the following characteristic assumptions:  
 
[A] bipolar relationship between two countries involving a 
direct one-way transfer of legal rules or institutions through 
the agency of governments involving formal enactment or 
adoption at a particular moment of time (a reception date) 
without major change …. [I]t is commonly assumed that 
the standard case involves transfer from an advanced 
(parent) civil or common law system to a less developed one, 
                                                 
83  See GJP, at ch 9 and 10. 
84  Most of the legal literature uses such terms as reception, 
transplantation, or transposition to refer to legal systems influencing 
or imitating each other. However, I prefer ‘diffusion’ because, 
although the word is misleading in suggesting movement from a 
single point, this is the standard term in the vast and rich social 
science literature that has been largely ignored by legal scholars. 
Twining (2005). 
85  Alan Watson can take credit for developing this insight over many 
years, starting with A Watson, Legal Transplants (1974/1993). 
86  GJP, at ch 9. 
 
52 
in order to bring about technological change (‘to 
modernise’) by filling in gaps or replacing prior local law. 
 
It is not difficult to show that none of these elements is necessary 
or even characteristic of actual processes of diffusion of law, 
broadly conceived. These processes are much more diverse and 
complex than the ‘naïve model’ suggests. This complexity is best 
illustrated not by setting up a contrapuntal model, but rather by 
indicating possible deviations from each of the elements in the 
paradigm case. In the present context this is relevant not only 
because of the importance of diffusion as a subject, but also 
because a similar method can be used to explore how adopting a 
global perspective may challenge standard assumptions in the 
orthodox or mainstream literature on a particular topic. (See Table 
IV.) 
 
At first sight Table IV, by emphasising the variety and complexity 
of processes of diffusion, can seem rather daunting. Indeed, more 
than one person has commented to me that this analysis makes 
the subject of diffusion unmanageable. This is to confuse the 
method of analysis, which is quite straightforward, with the 
phenomena of diffusion, which are indeed complex. In fact the 
table provides a quite simple tool for analysing particular instances 
of diffusion. Based on standard concepts in social science diffusion 
theory, it suggests a series of questions that a scholar can apply to 
any example.  
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TABLE IV: TRANSPLANTATION, RECEPTION, DIFFUSION84 
 
 Standard Case  Some Variants 
a.Source-
destination 
Bipolar: single exporter 
to single importer 
Single exporter to multiple destinations. 
Single importer from multiple sources.  
Multiple sources to multiple destinations 
etc. 




Horizontal transfers at other levels (e.g. 
regional, sub-state, non-state transnational) 
c. Pathways Direct one-way transfer Complex paths. Reciprocal influence. Re-
export 
d. Formal / 
informal 
Formal enactment or 
adoption 
Informal, semi-formal or mixed 
e. Objects Legal rules and 
concepts; 
Institutions 
Any legal phenomena or ideas, including 
ideology, theories, personnel, “mentality”, 
methods, structures, practices (official, 
private practitioners’, educational etc.), 
literary genres, documentary forms, 





Commercial and other non-governmental 
organizations.  
Armies. Individuals and groups: e.g. 
colonists, merchants, missionaries, slaves, 
refugees, believers etc who “bring their law 
with them”. Writers, teachers, activists, 
lobbyists etc.  
g. Timing 
 
One or more specific 
reception dates 
Continuing, typically lengthy process 
h. Power and 
prestige 
Parent civil or 
common law >> less 
developed 
Reciprocal interaction  




“No transportation without 
transformation” 
j. Relation to 
pre-existing law 
Blank slate. 








Technical Ideology, culture, technology 
l. Impact “It works” Performance measures. 
Empirical research. 
Monitoring. Enforcement  
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Thus the intriguing story of James Fitzjames Stephen’s Indian 
Evidence Act, 1872 can be told in terms of a process of export and 
adaptation of a branch of English law by a legal entrepreneur, its 
re-export via official channels to other jurisdictions and its informal 
and influential re-importation into England and its re-exportation 
overseas by barristers trained in the Inns of Court via a students’ 
textbook.87 The original source was an enterprising young English 
lawyer and reformer (change agent) who having failed to achieve 
reforms of the law of evidence in his own country had the 
opportunity to impose his (almost) ideal law on India - a fairly 
typical colonial story (level: municipal law). Stephen’s aim was to 
simplify and systematise the common law rules of evidence rather 
than to change them. He drafted a Bill that was formally enacted in 
1872 and he prepared a lengthy introduction and commentary 
which set out his general theory of the Law of Evidence.88 The Act, 
in Stephen’s words was ‘little more than an attempt to reduce the 
English law of evidence to the form of express propositions 
arranged in their natural order, with some modifications rendered 
necessary by the peculiar circumstances of India’. (minor 
adaptation). The Indian Evidence Act was much admired and 
became the standard model for almost identical legislation in 
many dependencies, largely through official channels (re-
exportation by various pathways). In India it has remained in force 
ever since, with only minor amendments since 1872, a nice 
example of Alan Watson’s thesis that many “transplants” survive 
for long periods almost unchanged and without any discernible 
relationship to local conditions or developments.89 However, over 
time Indian precedents have accumulated, the citation of English 
                                                 
87  For a more detailed account See Twining (2006) at pp. 56-61. 
88  J.F. Stephen (1872). The Introduction ran to 134 pages and, although 
somewhat discursive, remains one of the classic contributions to the 
theory of evidence. On the Indian Evidence Act, see Gledhill (1964), 
241-5. 
89  Watson (1974/1993). 
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precedents declined, substantial local practitioners’ treatises and 
slender student aids were published, so that Stephen’s version of 
the law of evidence is now part of the intellectual capital of the 
Indian Bar - a continuing story spread over nearly 140 years. While 
these points suggest that Stephen’s Act has been influential in 
India (and beyond) there is almost no systematic empirical 
evidence about how it affects the practices of trial courts, especially 
lower courts (impact). 
 
Stephen was also very influential on the theory and practice of the 
law of evidence in England. In 1873, at the invitation of the 
Attorney-General (Sir John Coleridge), he drafted an Evidence Bill 
based on the Indian Act. However, having presented the Bill on the 
last day of the Parliamentary session, Coleridge was elevated to the 
House of Lords and the Bill was never officially published. In the 
words of Radzinowicz, ‘[Stephen] not discouraged, and in a truly 
Benthamite spirit, embarked upon the business of codification as a 
private enterprise’.90 Appointed as Professor of Common Law at 
the Inns of Court, Stephen lectured on the Law of Evidence on the 
basis of his prior work and in 1876 he published the first edition of 
his Digest of the Law of Evidence. This was a blackletter text which 
followed closely the wording of his Act and Bill and which was 
backed by the theory of evidence that he had developed in India. 
The Digest was a conspicuous success in three ways: first, it was 
immensely popular not only in England, but throughout the 
common law world, because it gave a compact, systematic and 
accessible treatment of a subject that had been perceived to be a 
jumble of technicalities. Its closeness to the Indian Evidence Act 
increased its influence in countries that had used it as a model 
(widespread informal diffusion by a juristic text). Second, it survived 
for over seventy years in England as the leading student text on the 
                                                 
90  Radzinowicz (1957) at 9. On the American Restatements as a form of 
private legislation, designed to circumvent the state legislatures, see 
GJP pp. 306-12. 
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subject - the twelfth edition was published in 1948 (continuing 
influence). Third, not only English barristers, but students who 
came to the Inns of Court from all over the Commonwealth and 
Empire, acquired their basic knowledge of the law of evidence 
from Stephen’s teaching and text. Thus Stephen’s basic theory, ideas 
and rules were re-exported informally by various pathways to many 
countries over a long period of time. This short case study illustrates 
how Table IV can be applied in a quite straightforward way to 
almost any example of diffusion of law. It is a matter of asking 
questions about sources, levels, pathways, objects, agency, timing, 
power, change, impact and so on in an orderly way.91 
 
Globalisation not only has implications for our detailed 
understanding of particular subjects, it also suggests possible 





The main purpose of this lecture is to suggest an approach for any 
individual scholar to reflect on the implications of globalisation for 
their specialism, course, or specific research topic. The key is to 
adopt a wide interpretation of globalisation, to identify one’s 
normal working assumptions when dealing with one’s specialism, 
and to identify points at which any or all of these assumptions are 
challenged by adopting a genuinely global perspective. One can set 
                                                 
91  For an application of this approach to the large scale and complex 
reception of law in Turkey see Twining (2005). As I claimed that my 
analysis in terms of standard social science concepts painted a similar 
picture to that to be found in the best accounts in the extensive 
literature on Turkey, Esin Őrűcű - the doyenne of the subject - has 
suggested that the method adds nothing. On the contrary, it is a tool 
that systematises best practice, especially for a non-expert starting-out 
on the study of a particular example of diffusion/reception.  
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that against some perceptible trends in academic law as it has 
already responded, largely in a piece-meal way, to these challenges.  
 
This kind of perspective suggests some likely directions in which 
our discipline may move in response to the changing situation. 
Again this is as much trend-spotting as trend-setting. 
First in respect of fields of law one can expect that: 
 
(i) Established transnational fields command increased 
attention:  
(ii) New subjects with a strong transnational orientation 
emerge; 
(iii) Traditional subjects formerly perceived as domestic will 
acquire new transnational dimensions: 
(iv) There will be an increased awarenerss of pluralism and 
multiculturalism in the domestic context.  
(v) These developments will require systematic rethinkings 
of particular fields and their relations to each other.  
(vi) So far as legal theory is concerned we need to review the 
Western canon and ask: are there forgotten jurists in the 
Western tradition who now deserve more attention? That 
has happened with Kant’s Perpetual Peace and to some 
extent with Vico, Grotius, and Leibniz. We also need to 
re-interpret the mainstream, as has already been done by 
Tamanaha on Hart, Pogge on Rawls, Twining on 
Llewellyn, and in a different way, Singer on Bentham. 
And, most important, we need to ask are there not jurists 
and schools of thought in other legal traditions that 
demand our attention as we try to cope with the 
problems of an increasingly interdependent world?  
(vii) We cannot but work largely within our received tradition 
and law is a practical subject that on the whole require 
particularistic detailed local knowledge. We should not 
abandon our heritage, but rather set our scholarship in a 
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global context and have at least a working general 








Bentham and Montesquieu  
 
Jeremy Bentham was inspired by Montesquieu in his youth and 
regularly used him as a reference point. He admired Montesquieu 
as a forerunner of utilitarianism and for his vision and intellectual 
ambition, but his general attitude was more ambivalent. For 
example, Bentham thought that Montesquieu exaggerated the 
importance of the influence of climate on legislation, he rejected 
his doctrines of the separation of powers and the balance of 
powers, and he thought that he was not scientific enough: his 
generalisations were impressionistic and fanciful rather than based 
on evidence.92 Both men admired Bacon. Montesquieu tried to 
bridge the gap between is and ought, but he sometimes 
“confounded the question of fact with the question of fitness”.93 
Montesquieu, a forerunner of the sociology of law and cultural 
relativism, was mainly concerned with description; Bentham was 
more concerned with prescription. 
Nowhere is this ambivalence more apparent than in Bentham’s 
treatment of transplantation of laws.94 Diffusion/ transplantation 
is now a topic of central concern in comparative law and legal 
theory, especially in the wake of “globalisation”. To what extent law 
is or should be context- and culture-specific is a central issue in the 
study and practice of transnational diffusion, harmonisation and 
unification of law and in local law reform, where foreign models 
and the experience of other countries are under consideration. The 
publication of a definitive version of Bentham’s essay on place and 
                                                 
92  Mack (1962) 113-14. 
93  1 Works 180 (Bowring). 
94  Bentham used the metaphor of “transplantation” in several places in 
“Place and Time”. In the Bowring version of the essay, three of the 
chapter headings use the phrase “transplanting laws”, but this seems 
to be an editorial change. 
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time in matters of legislation is therefore opportune/of special 
interest.95 For Montesquieu and Bentham deserve to be viewed as 
classic forerunners of contemporary discussions on 
transplantation of laws. At first sight they represent two extremes: 
Montesquieu, the contextualist, emphasising the intimate 
connections between law and local history, geography, and 
manners; Bentham gives the impression of being a near-
universalist in legislation, the “Legislator of the World”, peddling 
his pannomion as if “one size fits all”, a technocrat largely 
indifferent to local conditions and culture.96 The relationship is 
more complex than that.97  
 
Some of Bentham’s best -known writings support this image. He 
was a universalist in ethics; and he believed human nature to be 
universal. In “Place and Time” he wrote: 
 
“[I]s the catalogue of pains and pleasures different in one 
country from what it is in another? Have different countries 
different catalogues of pleasures and pains? The affirmative, 
I think, will hardly be maintained: in this point at least 
human nature may be pronounced to be everywhere the 
same.”98 
 
                                                 
95  P. Schofield (ed.) “Place and Time”, first published in Engelmann 
(2011) (hereafter PT). In the Bowring edition, the essay is entitled “Of 
the Influence of Place and Time in Matters of Legislation”.  
96  One exception is Oren Ben Dor, who advances an interpretation which 
emphasises place, time and culture in Bentham’s constitutional 
thought (Ben Dor (2000) Ch.6). On the extent of the bowdlerisation of 
the manuscript by Dumont, Bowring, and Smith see Engelmann and 
Pitts (2011). 
97  Bentham is here concerned with one-way transfer of state law, 
legislator to legislator. On other patterns of diffusion of law see above 
p.46 (Table IV). 
98  Id. at 155. 
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The conditions which require adaptation of laws to context all 
pertain to circumstances influencing sensibility - how people in fact 
experience pleasures and pains.99 These can be divided into 
“universally applying circumstances” and “exclusively applying 
circumstances”. In his Codification Proposal, a late work, Bentham 
argued that for codification a single foreign draftsman is preferable 
to a local individual or committee, because he will have greater 
moral aptitude (he will be less influenced by sinister interests and 
affections) and that the process will be more transparent.100 His 
lack of local knowledge can be remedied by the provision of 
documents about local conditions and, in any case, “the deficiency 
is not so great as it will be apt to appear”101: 
 
“In comparison of the universally-applying, the extent of the 
exclusively-applying circumstances will be found to be very 
inconsiderable. Moreover, throughout the whole of the field, 
the exclusively applying circumstances will be found to be 
circumscribed as it were by, and included in, the universally 
applying circumstances. The great outlines, which require to 
be drawn, will be found to be the same for every territory, for 
every race, and for every time. “ 
 
Bentham’s argument is that the end for all is the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number, and adaptation of the technically 
best code only requires that special local deviations from a standard 
case be taken into account in order to attain that goal. Bentham 
gives extensive examples of cultural and other differences that need 
to be considered, and he emphasises that many such differences 
are morally neutral, but he implies that by and large these are 
                                                 
99  Ibid. 
100  “Codification Proposal” in ‘Legislator of the World’: Writings on 
Codification, Law and Education (ed. P. Schofield and J. Harris (CW, 
1998) at 279-81. 
101  Id. at 291. 
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exceptions that can be accommodated by local draftsmen working 
through particular laws in great detail and making needed 
adjustments. Human nature, the principle of utility and the 
structure, concepts and organization of the codes remain constant. 
Allowance should be made for the point that in Codification 
Proposal and other late writings, Bentham was trying to sell his 
services as a scientific expert to a variety of potential clients. Even 
so, taken on their own, such views appear to fit exactly the image of 
the Victorian liberal utilitarian imperialist bringing “the blessings 
of civilization” in the form of English law to backward or even 
“barbarian” peoples.102 It also fits the image of the contemporary 
foreign expert touting modern, technologically superior laws, 
“good governance”, and the Rule of law to “developing countries” 
and countries in transition. In short, Bentham’s pannomion looks 
like an imperialist project. 
A careful reading of the full text of “Time and Place” suggests 
that this image needs to be reconsidered. First, recent volumes in 
The Collected Works confirm that Bentham held strong anti-colonial 
views fairly consistently for most of his life.103 He may have been 
convinced by the Mills that there were some benefits to India of 
British rule, but he was always clear about the costs to both 
colonisers and colonised.104 Second, Bentham’s pannomion was 
not an imperial project. He did have a technological attitude to 
legislation, but it was not based on ideas of racial or cultural 
superiority - indeed, he de-emphasised culture in contrast to 
                                                 
102  Bentham did not accept John Stuart Mill’s easy distinction between 
barbarians and civilized peoples, see Pitts (2011) 481-2. 
103  Especially, Rid Yourselves of Ultramaria in P. Schofield (ed.) Colonies, 
Commerce and Constitutional Law (CW 1995).  
104  Pitts (2011) at 480-88 (emphasizing inter alia Bentham’s concern with 
happiness in the circumstances rather than “national character” and 
the sense of insecurity felt by the Indian subjects of colonial misrule).  
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material conditions105- and he did not wish to impose his ideas on 
anyone, especially not people in far away places. The only question 
with regard to a particular proposal for reform was: would it 
maximize utility? Third, he distinguished quite clearly between the 
general framework and more abstract parts of his codes and the 
particular provisions which needed to be worked out in detail 
according to local conditions of time and place. How far he 
changed his views as he got older about the importance local 
circumstances influencing sensibility is a matter of interpretation. 
Fourth, the full text of “Place and Time”, an early work, reinstates 
the powerful criticisms of British rule in India and of English law 
that were edited out in the Bowring edition. When Bentham 
compares the circumstances of England and Bengal and postulates 
that he takes his own country for the standard, he is being 
ironic.106 His argument is that even a law that is ideally suited to 
country X, will probably be unsuitable to country Y and that it is 
highly probable that a law unsuited to country X will be even more 
unsuitable to country Y. Much of English law was unsuited to 
England.107  
 
                                                 
105  Cf. the scepticism of Yash Ghai about the relative importance of 
“culture” rather than material interests in modern constitutional 
negotiations in multi-ethnic societies (Ghai, 2010 at 113-115, 135-7). 
106  In subsequent writings Bentham uses the pannomion as the standard 
and so the question of its suitability to the conditions of any particular 
country does not arise.  
107  Given Bentham’s antipathy to the common law there is a further irony 
that the lack of overt influence in Latin America (except at a very 
abstract level) is attributed to a difference in legal traditions: 
“Bentham’s view of himself was that of a world legislator. He offered 
his services to all states and believed that his proposals suited every 
political community regardless of time and place. Local peculiarities 
were to be taken care of by marginal adaptation. In reality, his 
proposals were that of an English mind reacting to common law, and it 
is quite natural that his real influence on Latin American law remained 
scant in the end.” (Samtleben (1986) 481-2).  
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In an excellent article on “Empire in Bentham’s thought”, Jennifer 
Pitts nicely contrasts the attitudes of Bentham and Montesquieu: 
“The critical conversation with Montesquieu that runs through 
‘Place and Time’ shows Bentham to be far more suspicious than 
Montesquieu had been of European pretensions to superiority 
over, and even reliable knowledge of, non-European societies. The 
essay includes a number of subtle efforts to de-exoticize non-
European societies and to turn a critical eye on European practices 
whose familiarity left them widely unscrutinized. Many of these 
were purged from the Bowring edition and are only now recovered 
from the manuscripts for publication. Bentham chides 
Montesquieu for describing certain unpalatable practices such as 
infanticide and the selling of daughters as distinctively Asian, 
without mentioning the existence of the same practices in Greece 
and Rome, and indeed (in the case of selling daughters) in 
attenuated form in modern Europe. He rejects Montesquieu’s 
credulous references to reports of outlandish customs among 
foreign peoples, such as a supposed Formosan abortion practice 
that he calls ‘too foolish and too atrocious to have the force of law 
in any country under the sun.’”108 
Bentham’s treatment of transplantation is an attempt at systematic 
theorising as part of his general theory of legislation.109 Bentham 
posed the issue sharply: 
 
“To give the question at once universal form, what is the 
influence of the circumstances of place and time in matters 
of legislation? What are the coincidences and what the 
                                                 
108  Jennifer Pitts, “Great and Distant Crimes: Empire in Bentham’s 
thought” in Engelmann (2011) at 478-499, at 486 (footnotes omitted). 
109  The main sources are “Place and Time” and a short section in The 
Theory of Legislation Ch. IX Circumstances which affect sensibility s.4 
Practical application of the theory at 44 et seq (C.K.Ogden (ed.) 1931, 
translated from Traités de legislation civile et pénale edited by Dumont by 
Richard Hildreth (1802). 
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diversities that ought to subsist between laws established in 
different countries and at different periods, supposing them 
in each instance the best to be established?”110 
 
Bentham’s suggested approach was to make a detailed analysis of 
the laws of the exporting country and of the laws of the importing 
country and then to compare the differences in the circumstances 
influencing sensibility. This would require very detailed analysis, 
involving “little more than manual labour”.111 To assist in this task, 
two sets of tables would be required. The first set would exhibit in 
detail the particulars of the body of laws treated as the standard, the 
second set a general table of the circumstances influencing 
sensibility in the receiving country. For the second set Bentham 
followed Montesquieu fairly closely and in a note remarked: 
 
“Before Montesquieu, a man who had a distant country 
given to him to make laws for would make short work of 
it. Name to me the people, he would have said, reach 
down my bible and the business is done at once…. Since 
Montesquieu, the number of documents which a legislator 
would require is considerably enlarged. Send the people 
(he will say) to me or me to the people: lay open to me the 
whole tenor of their life and their conversation: paint to 
me the face and geography of the country: give me as close 
and minute a view as possible of their present laws, their 
manner and their religion.”  
 
Bentham differed from Montesquieu in emphasising material 
conditions more than manners, in being prepared to change 
manners by direct or indirect legislation if utility required it112, and 
                                                 
110  PT 152. The wording is only slightly different in 1 works 171. 
111  PT 156. 
112  Bentham criticised Montesquieu for asserting dogmatically that laws 
should not be used to change customs and manners (PT 177). 
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in believing that legislation can be scientific. He may also, 
especially in his later writings, have played down the differences 
between societies - but this was a matter of emphasis. He was at 
one with Montesquieu in believing that the laws most conducive to 
promoting happiness had to be in harmony with local 
circumstances affecting sensibility and that studying these 
conditions in detail was a necessary precondition for good law-
making. He gave some weight to Montesquieu’s ideas on the 
importance of history, geography, and culture on the development 
of law, and advocated a quite moderate and gradualist approach to 
transplantation of laws. He argued that local sensibilities should be 
heeded and humoured, but that they should not be treated as 
insurmountable by the utilitarian legislator, who might need to rely 
more on “indirect legislation” than direct imposition of new codes, 
at least in the short-term. 
 
The essay on “Place and Time” was an early work, which Bentham 
probably considered to be incomplete. It is not very well-
constructed. Although not overtly exhibiting an attitude of imperial 
superiority, it contains some passages that appear racist or 
Islamophobic to modern eyes. Nevertheless, it repays study both as 
                                                                                                
However, he went some way to agreeing that generally such change 
should be brought about by persuasion or indirect legislation. For 
example, in his instructions (“rules..given for the purpose of 
information) he included the following: “1. No law shall be changed, no 
prevailing usage should be abolished, without special reason: without 
some specific assignable benefit [which] can be shewn to be likely as 
the result of such a change. 2.The changing of a custom repugnant to 
our own manners and sentiments, for no other reason than such 
repugnancy, is not to be reputed a benefit. 3. In all matters of 
indifference, let the political sanction remain neuter: and let the 
authority of the moral sanction takes its course. 4. The easiest 
innovation to introduce is that effected merely by refusing to a coercive 
custom the sanction of the law, especially where the coercion imposed 




an early example of a systematic approach to the methods of 
transplanting laws and because it shows Bentham as being more 
sensitive to local conditions and the importance of local knowledge 
than he has usually been credited with. The gap between Bentham 
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